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DETERMINANTS OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AND LEARNING IN 
HYBRID PUBLIC PRIVATE ALLIANCES 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper uses the case study of a hybrid public-private strategic alliance as data to 
complement and contrast with the traditional views on knowledge transfer and learning 
between alliance partners.  In particular, the paper explores whether the concept of 
competitive collaboration conceptualized by Hamel (1991) in his seminal work holds true 
for all forms of strategic alliances. Conceptualizing the knowledge boundaries of 
organisations in alliances as a ‘collaborative membrane’, we focus attention on the 
permeability of these boundaries rather than the actual location of the boundaries. In this 
vein, we present a case study of a major public sector organization that illustrates how 
these principles have allowed it to start rebuilding its internal capabilities adopting a 
more collaborative stance and ensuring their knowledge boundaries are highly porous as 
they move more major projects into hybrid public private alliance contracts. 
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DETERMINANTS OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AND LEARNING IN 
HYBRID PUBLIC PRIVATE ALLIANCES 
Traditional perspectives on knowledge transfer and learning in alliances between private 
firms have suggested that partners will compete with each other for knowledge and 
resources.  Our research into hybrid public-private alliances has found that partners do 
not compete but choose to cooperate in order to achieve a mutual knowledge sharing and 
learning agenda.  This competition-cooperation dichotomy suggests that a review of the 
theory on inter-partner knowledge transfer and learning is necessary.  Furthermore, the 
competition-cooperation dichotomy has implications for organizational structure and 
especially the conceptualization of the boundaries of the firm – at least in respect of the 
public sector organization. 
  
With the emergence of New Public Management, government agencies (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2000, English 2005, English and Skellern 2005), have pulled back their 
corporate boundaries through outsourcing and divestment of core activities (Young 
2007). As a result, they have increasingly cooperated with other organizations, mainly 
private enterprise, to engage in activities and access resources (Hood 1995, Lapsley 1999, 
Seal 1999), including knowledge, outside their own boundaries (Grant and Baden-Fuller 
2004) to deliver according to their mandate. This mirrors trends in large industrial 
organizations where new organizational forms are emerging as firms roll back their 
boundaries through downsizing, divestment, refocussing and outsourcing (Grant and 
Baden-Fuller 1995). Essentially government is using contractual structures, such as 
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strategic alliances, to replicate the vertical integration which previously existed internally 
(Hart and Moore 1990, Williamson 1991b).  
 
Using a case study of a hybrid public-private strategic alliance, this paper explores 
whether the concept of competitive collaboration (Prahalad and Hamel 1990, Hamel 
1991) holds true for all forms of strategic alliances. Furthermore, we examine the premise 
that the nature of organizations boundaries is more important than simply the location of 
these boundaries.  In particular we discuss the permeability of boundaries and how this 
affects the flow of knowledge and learning between partners. 
 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
As the understanding of knowledge is our fundamental concern, we examine the key 
perspectives on knowledge in the strategic management literature.  McGee, Thomas, and 
Wilson (2005) suggest there are four different perspectives of knowledge in strategic 
management theory. Firstly the resource-based view of knowledge (Wernerfelt 1984, 
Prahalad and Hamel 1990, Grant 1991, Hamel 1991, Grant 1996b) sees knowledge as an 
asset for gaining competitive advantage. The subsequent knowledge based theory of the 
firm (Grant 1996b, Spender 1996) shifts the focus from value appropriation to value 
creation (Berger and Luckmann 1966, Ghoshal and Moran 1996). Secondly the 
Schumpeterian (1934) view reflects knowledge as innovation. Thirdly, the evolutionary 
economics view (Alchian 1950, 1953, Nelson and Winter 1982) focuses on knowledge as 
being embedded in routines; and fourthly the dynamic capabilities view suggests that 
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knowledge is achieved through learning (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997, Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000). These perspectives are complementary and are all useful for analyzing the 
determinants of knowledge transfer and the resultant learning in strategic alliances.  
 
Our starting point for analysis is the seminal study by Hamel (1991) of the extent to 
which, and the means through which, collaboration might lead to the reapportionment of 
skills between strategic alliances partners. As a result, Hamel outlines three key 
determinants for inter-partner learning, namely intent, transparency and receptivity. 
Furthermore, Hamel asserts that because of the asymmetries in the skills of firms, 
collaboration may provide one partner in an alliance with the opportunity to improve its 
competitive position, both within and without the alliance, by internalizing the skills of 
the other partner.  
 
We have chosen Hamel’s study as our starting point not only because he was the first 
scholar to look at knowledge management in alliances from a strategic perspective, but 
because of his conceptualization of an alliance as a “collaborative membrane”. We see 
this conceptualization as significant because we suggest that the nature of the 
organizational boundary in terms of permeability matters as much – if not more – as 
compared to where it is drawn. Jacobides and Billinger (2006) introduce the notion of 
permeable organizational boundaries to explain how markets and hierarchies can be used 
simultaneously for the same activity as permeability allows for inputs and outputs, and 
most importantly knowledge, to move relatively freely into and out of the organization. 
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Building on the work of Hamel, and more recently Jacobides and Billinger (2006), we 
further develop the membrane metaphor by exploring related biological constructs such 
as permeability.  
 
DETERMINANTS OF INTER-PARTNER KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
Organizations with specialised or complementary knowledge can learn from each other 
by establishing collaborative partnerships, which can range from joint ventures, consortia 
and alliances to contractual agreements (Grant and Baden-Fuller 1995, 2004). The ideal 
is to benefit from a two-way flow of information, knowledge and resources. Key motives 
for partnerships are seen as transaction costs, competitive positioning and organizational 
learning (Davenport and Prusak 1998). From a transaction cost economic perspective, the 
governance of transactions, which involves contracting, control and incentive systems, is 
influences by three factors: bounded rationality, opportunistic behaviour and asset 
specificity (Williamson 1981, 1991a, 1991b). The degree to which organizations need 
specific assets to operate and the extent to which these assets have unique capabilities, 
interacts with the transaction costs of engaging in market transactions to shape the 
boundaries of the organization.  
 
Understanding the motives and factors that encourage or impede knowledge transfer and 
learning place us in a better position to establish the best context and method for this to 
occur, e.g. closeness, cultural match (Badaracco 1991a, 1991b, Davenport and Prusak 
1998). Hamel (1991) indicates that knowledge transfer is rare when an explicit and 
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clearly communicated learning motive is lacking. Others who support the idea that inter-
partner learning must be by design, i.e. an explicit strategic intention, and not default 
include Inkpen and Crossan (1995), Davenport and Prusak (1998), Zack (1999) and 
Dixon (2000). In contrast, Helleloid and Simonin (1994) believe that learning can occur 
as an unintended consequence of inter firm collaboration. Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn 
and Jaffe (2006) suggest that while some knowledge flow across organizations or 
between units within an organization may be accidental or involuntary, intentional 
knowledge flows will be greater when they are in the interests of both parties. Hamel 
(1991) found that in the absence of a clearly articulated learning agenda individual 
businesses appeared unlikely to devote resource to the task of learning and that they 
could expect skills substitution or surrender. Thus, learning needs to be an explicit and 
measurable motive included in each contract with outsourcing partners. However, a 
contract is not enough and these need to be underpinned by sound relationships and 
skills, because the quality of learning is equal to the quality of the dialogue between 
people sharing tacit knowledge (Hamel 1991). Reflection, questioning and probing 
deliver a better quality of interaction and thus better knowledge and learning (Argyris and 
Schön 1978). 
 
While previous authors may have suggested setting up appropriate structures for 
enhancing knowledge transfer and learning, Hamel in his seminal article (1991), is very 
specific in his description of the three specific determinants central to the internalisation 
of knowledge from inter-partner learning, namely intent, transparency and receptivity. 
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We now discuss the importance of each of these constructs for knowledge transfer and 
learning, as well as the impact of collaboration as competition on the ability of 
organizations to acquire knowledge or learn from a partner. 
 
Hamel found that whether or not an organization possessed an explicit internalisation 
intent or desire seems to be a product of whether it viewed the collaboration being 
entered into as a more or less permanent collaboration or as a temporary vehicle for 
improving it competitiveness in relation to the partner (Hamel 1991). Other factors 
impacting intent are the resources of the organization in relation to the partner and other 
players in the industry, the calculation of the pay-off of the learning and the preference 
for balance versus asymmetric dependence within the alliance (Hamel 1991). 
 
The factors that determine transparency in a relationship between two partners include 
the degree to which one partner can penetrate the social context which surrounds the 
other partner and the organizations attitude towards outsiders (Hamel 1991). It is in this 
social context characterised by organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms, 
rather than documents and repositories, that much of the most powerful, embedded, tacit 
knowledge resides (Davenport and Prusak 1998, Tywoniak 2007a). This tacit knowledge 
is highly personal, embedded in experience and laden with emotion, values and ideals 
which are difficult to formalise and share with others, particularly between organizations 
(Badaracco 1991a, 1991b, Nonaka 1991, Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, Nonaka and Konno 
1998). When acquiring knowledge from another organization, it is not just the technical 
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knowledge which is required but also access to and understanding of stories, myths, 
language and culture of the other organization (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). This is a 
way to comprehend the embedded knowledge that characterise routine (Nelson and 
Winter 1982).  
 
Receptivity is the crux of the knowledge transfer and process, because there is a 
fundamental difference between having knowledge and understanding what to do with it 
(von Krogh and Roos 1996), i.e. being able to transform knowledge inputs into outputs 
(Grant and Baden-Fuller 1995, Rifkin and Fulop 1997). Inkpen and Crossan (1995) 
observed firms that had explicit learning objectives going into a joint venture, but which 
were unable to internally mobilise the appropriate mechanisms and systems to transfer 
knowledge (Love, Irani, and Edwards 2003) from the joint venture into the parent. Grant 
and Baden-Fuller (1995) identify the efficiency of the integration mechanisms and the 
extent of capacity of utilisation of knowledge, i.e. the degree to which the new 
knowledge matches the organization’s product domain, as the two factors critical to 
knowledge integration.  
 
Receptivity or absorptive capacity is dependent on the diligence and persistence with 
which people approach the task of learning (Hamel 1991). Absorptive capacity is a firm’s 
ability to recognise the value of new information, assimilate it and apply it (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). In essence even if you acquire the best knowledge, unless you have the 
ability to internalise it, the knowledge is useless to you. Absorptive capacity is linked to 
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an organization’s prior related knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  Potentially, 
organizations with greater prior knowledge have a greater capacity to learn and absorb 
new knowledge.   
 
Critical to receptivity is the ongoing commitment of senior management to learning, i.e. 
an explicit learning agenda (Hamel 1991). A learning orientation may make an 
organization more skilled at creating, acquiring and transferring knowledge, as well as 
giving it the capacity to change organizational behaviours (Garvin 1993), thus enhancing 
its ability to learn (Burpitt 2004). The ability to recognise, acquire and utilise new 
knowledge is itself a valuable resource (Grant 1996a). Organizations which have a rigid 
set of managerial beliefs which result in the inability or unwillingness to abandon or 
unlearn past practices will severely limit the effectiveness of organizational learning 
(Inkpen and Crossan 1995). 
 
While the external relationships allows the organization access to the knowledge of 
alliance partners, these relationships have only limited relevance to the diffusion of the 
knowledge within the organization (Walter, Lechner, and Kellermanns 2007). Thus 
successful knowledge transfer is determined by effective external, as well as internal, 
linkages (Adler and Kwon 2002). Hamel (1991) says that partners with the greatest need 
to learn often have the highest barriers to receptivity. If the knowledge gap is substantial, 
knowledge transfer may be almost impossible. This may result in an inability to 
understand what the partner is doing, as well as not being able to understand the process 
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leading to the partner’s knowledge development (Hamel 1991). Other key factors 
impacting receptivity are the personal skills of the individuals involved in the learning 
and the ability to match the pace of absorption to pace of partners innovation (Hamel 
1991, Brown and Duguid 2002).  
 
Hamel (1991) highlights the need to first unlearn as a precondition for receptivity. 
Knowledge ‘makes you wise in some ways, but it can make you a blindfolded fool in 
others’ (Davies 1975 in Hargadon 2004, 13). Hamel (1991) says that there will be more 
to unlearn if an organization has been in the industry for a long time and has become a 
laggard. Unlearning is about changing cognition and behaviour and employees need to 
alter perceptual maps and drive out old behaviour with new behaviour (Nystrom and 
Starbuck 1984, Hamel 1991, Inkpen and Crossan 1995, de Holan, Phillips, and Lawrence 
2004, Navarro and Moya 2005).  
 
The concept of collaboration as competition is founded on the premise that there are two 
basic processes in any alliance: value creation (putting in) and value appropriation (taking 
out) (Hamel 1991). Essentially what you take out – economic, competitive advantage, 
skills, competencies, gives you greater bargaining power in the partnership and in the 
market and in forming other partnerships (Hamel 1991). However, this heightens the risk 
of opportunistic behaviour and self-interest which could negate the benefits of 
collaboration. Badaracco (1991a; 1991b) sees managing knowledge transfer as a key 
managerial responsibility and managers must protect core knowledge competencies, 
 11
assess and attempt to access the knowledge of partners (Badaracco 1991b). Hamel (1991) 
talks of the “collaborative membrane” through which skills and competencies flow 
between partners. The degree to which this membrane is permeable, and the directions in 
which it is permeable, determines relative learning (Hamel 1991). This membrane 
analogy suggests an ongoing process of collaboration exchange. Badaracco (1991b) 
believes that effective transfer of knowledge requires closeness but not necessarily 
openness. However, closeness is particularly important for accessing the highly complex 
knowledge embedded in social relations (Helleloid and Simonin 1994), which may result 
in causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt 1982, Reed and DeFillippi 1990). The more 
multidimensional an organization’s competitive advantage and the more each dimension 
of competitive advantage is based on a complex bundle of organizational capabilities 
rather than individual resources, the more difficult it is for a competitor or outsider to 
understand the determinants of that organization’s success (Lippman and Rumelt 1982, 
Reed and DeFillippi 1990, Grant 2005). This ambiguity creates a barrier to others 
imitating the knowledge and/or resources which resulted in the success. Also, knowledge 
acquisition may be impacted by asymmetric information (Akerlof 1970), which puts the 
party without the knowledge at a distinct disadvantage in the knowledge transfer. Inkpen 
and Crossan (1995) see the differences or discrepancies between partners’ competency 
areas as potential motivators for learning to take place, but it is whether or not these 
discrepancies are not identified and resolved that impacts on whether learning takes 
places. 
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THE PERMEABILITY METAPHOR 
As membranes and permeability are central concepts for us in terms of better 
understanding the way that organizational boundaries are configured relative to 
operational boundaries and the necessary subsequent transfer of knowledge, we build on 
existing concepts in management as well as referring to biology – the original source of 
such concepts.  To begin with, to explain how knowledge is transferred between (and 
within) organizations, we build on the ‘collaborative membrane’ metaphor used by 
Hamel (1991) – and borrowed from biology.  The membrane metaphor is particularly 
pertinent to transfer of knowledge between organisations when you consider the five 
related yet distinct roles of biological membranes (Becker, Kleinsmith, and Hardin 2003).  
While membranes define the boundaries and serve as permeability barriers of the cell, 
they also serve as loci of specific functions and control the movement of substances in 
and out of the cell.  However, most importantly, membranes contain the receptors 
required for the detection of external signals and provide the mechanisms for cell-to-cell 
communication. 
 
This framework allows us to make the ‘semantic leap’ (Cornelissen 2005) by articulating 
knowledge boundaries and processes through incorporating the other associated 
biologically-related concepts of permeability, and related terminology such as absorption, 
diffusion and solubility.   
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The use of metaphor by organizational researchers as a means of understanding 
organizations, and being able to probe more deeply and generate emergent meaning or 
make the unfamiliar familiar, plays a crucial role in mainstream practice, particularly in 
qualitative research (Inns 2002, Cornelissen 2005, Cornelissen, Kafouros, and Lock 
2005).  In particular, the concept of organizational boundaries has been viewed through 
mechanical and organic metaphorical lenses since the 1950s (Heracleous 2004). 
 
In essence, metaphors work in much the same way as models to assist in bridging the gap 
between theory and practice (Von Ghyczy 2003). Furthermore, the use of new metaphors 
revitalises theoretical concepts that have become hackneyed and have lost their former 
metaphorical underpinnings (Cornelissen, Kafouros, and Lock 2005).  Tsoukas (1991, 
1993) suggests that metaphors can be used creatively to reveal ‘literal’ structural 
similarities between concepts that were not evident before and which can provide new 
insights into organizations.   
 
In biology, permeability refers to the rate at which a penetrant – liquid or gas – diffuses 
through a boundary (Massey 2003). Permeability is dependent on solubility, which refers 
to the penetrant and the structural characteristics of the barrier.  There are few substances 
(only gases such as oxygen, nitrogen and carbon dioxide), which enjoy the ability of free 
or simple diffusion, i.e. the ability to move spontaneously across a barrier (Bolsover et al. 
2004). In other cases the rate of passage of substances through a membrane are 
determined by temperature, concentration and pressure. Just as these factors are required 
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to push molecules through a membrane, so the rate of knowledge flow between 
organizations is determined by factors such as criticality, and the key determinants 
identified by Hamel (1991) - strategic intent, transparency and receptivity or absorptive 
capacity – which have been discussed in detail above.   
 
Criticality refers to how urgent the task is, how core is it to the business and how much 
will it affect the bottom line.  Furthermore, it is not enough to create knowledge, there 
must be an intent to use and share it, i.e. it must be translated into action before it is of 
worth (Macklup 1980, Dixon 2000, Inkpen 2005).  As in biology, where few substances 
can freely diffuse, organizations do not spontaneously create knowledge out of 
experience – it takes intention for this to happen (Dixon 2000).  The factors that 
determine transparency in a relationship between two partners include the degree to 
which one partner can penetrate the social context which surrounds the other partner and 
the organizations attitude towards outsiders (Hamel 1991).  Critical to transparency and 
closeness between partners in knowledge transfer are relationships (Inkpen 2005) based 
on trust and value congruency, whether at an individual and organizational level (Aadne, 
von Krogh, and Roos 1996).   
 
In knowledge transfer terms the solubility analogy reflects how the complexity of the 
knowledge, i.e. the degree of explicitness or codification versus tacitness or 
embeddedness impacts its ability to move between organizations.  While highly explicit 
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knowledge may move freely across boundaries, tacit knowledge takes considerable time 
and effort to transfer, if it is able to be transferred at all.   
 
Extra-organizational, as well as intra-organizational, boundaries can be conceptualised as 
semi- or selectively permeable membranes in the way that biological membranes are not 
equally permeable for all substances, but are selectively permeable, i.e. membranes can 
be permeated by a substance A but not by a substance B.  For example, the GORE-TEX® 
membrane contains over 9 billion microscopic pores per square inch. These pores are 
20,000 times smaller than a water droplet, but 700 times larger than a water vapour 
molecule, which makes the GORE-TEX® membrane completely waterproof from the 
outside, while allowing perspiration to escape from the inside (W. L. Gore & Associates 
2007).   
 
Using the GORE-TEX® example we are able to conceptualise why it easier for small 
amounts of simple or explicit knowledge which are easily understood by both partners to 
permeate through the boundary.  However, if you try and push something major through 
like a new system or something foreign and unknown, it becomes harder to understand, 
accept and assimilate.  This situation can potential destabilise the whole system and the 
knowledge will either be rejected completely or if the boundary is permeable enough to 
take it there will have to be adaptation on the receiving end.  In this way, organizations 
and their need to absorb new knowledge may be likened to cells which depend on 
balancing water uptake and loss and can burst if they take on too much water and 
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collapse if they lose too much (Bell 2007).  The GORE-TEX® example also explains 
how knowledge can be asymmetrically permeable.  For example if one organization 
values tacit knowledge and the partner in knowledge transfer values explicit knowledge 
and the membrane is designed to only allow for the flow of explicit knowledge then the 
knowledge flow with be asymmetrical.  This raises the issue of compatibility when 
forming strategic alliances, as evidenced in the early years of General Motors’ NUMMI 
alliance with Toyota.  While NUMMI was outperforming comparable GM plants, early 
attempts to transfer knowledge from NUMMI to GM were unsuccessful because GM 
advisors did not have the capacity to absorb the knowledge (Inkpen 2005). 
 
THE RATIONALE FOR HYBRID PUBLIC-PRIVATE ALLIANCES 
As the knowledge boundaries of the firm and the activity boundaries often fail to align, 
opportunities exist for alliances or other forms of intermediate organizational structures. 
From a transaction cost perspective, inter firm collaboration, both in its bilateral and 
network forms, has been viewed as an intermediate organizational form (Grant and 
Baden-Fuller 1995). Under certain circumstances these hybrid modes can be superior to 
either market transactions or internal governance (Williamson 1991b, Grant and Baden-
Fuller 1995, 2004). Williamson (1991a, 269) sees these hybrid forms as being a broad 
middle ground between these two extreme ‘polar forms’ or ideal types of markets and 
hierarchies. Hybrid structures are not a new phenomenon and have operated largely to 
support resources projects since the start of the 20th century (Harrigan 1986 in Mowery, 
Oxley, and Silverman 1996). The sense that hybrids are a new phenomenon may be 
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garnered from a rise in popularity since the 1970s, as well as a shift in motives for their 
establishment, which may include higher levels of knowledge exchange and technology 
transfer between partners (Kogut 1988, Inkpen and Crossan 1995, Mowery, Oxley, and 
Silverman 1996) and the adoption of new ways of structuring boundaries and internal 
organization (Foss 2002).  
 
Another perspective on this issue is that the ‘polar forms’ of markets and hierarchies are 
pure archetypes and work as theoretical constructs to help us make sense of reality. 
Heracleous (2004, 96) argues that using economic constructs such as transaction costs to 
theorize about boundaries is “parsimonious to the point of reductionism, caricaturing 
complex phenomena in terms of propositions that are clear but perhaps not always 
enlightening on actual boundary decisions taken by managers”. So, while thinking in 
ideal types can be a powerful sorting schema, in reality the boundaries of the firm have 
always been problematic (Heracleous 2004). Boundaries were never as discrete as we 
theorised that they were, because organizational structure is contingent on and adaptive to 
economic and environmental variable such as complexity, uncertainty and technology 
(Pugh 1973, Child 1975, Quinn 1978, Granovetter 1985). Even early theorists, including 
Coase (1937) recognised that these distinctions were artificial. Thus the firm boundaries 
are not necessarily clearly drawn (Weick 1979) and interlocked behaviours extend 
beyond firm boundaries to encompass its supply chain partners, allies and stakeholders in 
strategic networks (Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer 2000). This reflects Haracleous’ (2004) 
contention that boundaries should be conceptualized as relational processes, the 
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formation, properties and consequences of which are the result of complex, shifting, 
socially constructed and negotiated entities.  Thus, we begin to move from a functionalist 
view of organizational boundaries as the position which differentiates the internal 
organization from an external environment to a perspective which privileges the nature of 
the boundary, i.e. its permeability over the location of the boundary. 
 
INSERT FIGURE HERE 
 
Hybrids provide an efficient governance structure when transaction costs are higher than 
that which would make ‘spot’ cost efficient, but not high enough to justify the vertical 
integration typified by hierarchies.  Based on the idea that the value chain might be 
dispersed across different owners but that they are controlled in economic terms through 
the operation of core competencies (McGee, Thomas, and Wilson 2005), McGee (2003) 
develops the notion of the knowledge web which replaces the activity sets of the value 
chain with knowledge concepts. At the centre is what McGee (2003) refers to as the 
corporate glue, which is the organizationally embedded tacit knowledge (Badaracco 
1991a) or what Spender (1996) calls the collective knowledge. This corporate glue 
supports and is supported by core competencies, which in turn are buttressed by closely 
held partnerships (McGee, Thomas, and Wilson 2005). The corporate glue equates to 
corporate paradigm or culture (Fiol 1991), which has a profound bearing on how 
organizations perceive and engage with the environment (Daft and Weick 1984, Weick 
1988) – internally and externally.  
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Building on the knowledge web, Figure 1 reflects the existence of extraorganizational 
boundaries, as well as intraorganizational boundaries, to knowledge transfer. The nature 
of the organizational culture is critical to the permeability of the relationship between the 
organization and its external partners and ultimately to the organisations ability to 
transfer and absorb knowledge across internal boundaries. While the shared causal maps 
and values might be sources of efficiency for managing socially complex organizations, 
their wholly tacit nature can make them a double-edge sword as they might generate 
causal ambiguity for outside observers (Tywoniak 2007b) and because they are difficult 
to change they may be a source of strategic rigidities (Leonard-Barton 1992). 
Subcontracting relationships for which market contracting in sufficient are more remotely 
managed (McGee, Thomas, and Wilson 2005). This blurring of the boundaries between 
markets and hierarchies indicates that boundaries are more permeable than suggested by 
the economics of organization (Foss 2002). As previously mentioned, Hamel (1991) 
proffers the useful analogy of a “collaborative membrane” to describe the permeability of 
this boundary. The extent to which the membrane is permeable and the direction/s in 
which it is permeable determine the capacity of knowledge flow and thus relative 
learning (Hamel 1991). At the heart of this permeability is the fluid nature of knowledge, 
rather than issues of structure – legal, governance or task (Hamel 1991). Conceiving of an 
alliance as a collaborative membrane suggests that access to people, facilities, documents 
and other forms of knowledge is traded or shared between partners in an ongoing process 
of collaborative exchange (Hamel 1991). 
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The resultant hybrid public-private strategic alliances formed between the West 
Australian State Government and private enterprise, as a contingency response to New 
Public Management, reflect Teece’s (1992, 19) definition of strategic alliances as 
‘agreements characterized by the commitment of two or more firms to reach a common 
goal entailing the pooling of their resources and activities’. This sense of commitment to 
common goals and the equitable sharing of resources such as knowledge, contrasts with 
Hamel’s view of alliances as a competition for resources. Hamel (1991) found that the 
power vested in an organization through the alliance contract will almost certainly erode 
if its alliance partners are more adept at internalising knowledge or building new 
competencies. In contrast, Broadbent, Gill and Laughlin (2003) found that public-private 
partnership contracts engender the development of goodwill trust which facilitates the 
management of future uncertainty. Campbell and Harris (1993) suggest that in the 
context of long-term contracts individual self-interest as a measure of economic 
rationality should be replaced by common interest. Thus the adequate form of self-
interest in these contracts becomes cooperation (Campbell and Harris 1993). 
 
Trust and value congruency is critical to any knowledge transfer between partners, 
whether at an individual and organizational level (Aadne, von Krogh, and Roos 1996). 
The coevolution of cooperation, communication and trust are critical factors for managers 
to assess the outcome of any interorganizational activity (Anderson and Narus 1990; 
Inkpen and Birkenshaw 1994 in Aadne, von Krogh, and Roos 1996). Aadne et al. (1996) 
suggest that partners in knowledge transfer seek to reduce equivocality (ambiguity, 
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multiple and conflicting interpretations) and create shared meaning. Key to the issue of 
trust is that only individuals can establish relationships so firm-to-firm abstraction does 
not exist (Aadne, von Krogh, and Roos 1996). The importance of trust for knowledge 
transfer and creation is indicative of knowledge creation as a quintessentially human 
process, i.e. trust is a complex, intensely emotional and human process (Walker 2004). 
Trust is more likely to occur where there is an open and honest communication style. The 
importance of trust and relationships for the functioning of long-term hybrid partnerships 
(Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003) is born out by empirical evidence presented by 
Campbell and Harris (1993) which suggests that partners will work to preserve hybrid 
relationships despite issues which may arise with adherence to contractual obligations. 
 
Achieving effective knowledge transfer and learning in public-private alliances, in the 
current public sector environment, requires a shift in thinking which recognises the need 
to share a culture that goes beyond the organizational boundaries (Rowlinson and Cheung 
2002). It also requires a move away from the adversarial nature of contracting 
relationships which use dispute resolution mechanisms as a fall back position. The 
benefit in creating these partnerships is that they enable the organization to benefit from 
integration and specialisation in a manner that is most likely more difficult to replicate 
than if the knowledge was simply held internally. While a partner may be disadvantaged 
in the macro-bargain, i.e. through the form and structure of the contract, they may make 
gains in micro-bargains, i.e. through collaborative exchange and relationships because of 
their capacity to learn (Rowlinson and Cheung 2002).  
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These collaborative relationships are a central tenant of the knowledge based view of the 
firm, which offers advantages over the traditional transaction cost perspective in that it 
provides an understanding the drivers of collaboration (Grant 1996b, Spender 1996). 
Certainly, the flow of knowledge, enabled by information and communication 
technology, is changing the way individuals and organizations interact and work, both 
within organizations and with those outside the boundaries of the organization such as 
suppliers, consultants and contractors (Dixon 2000, Galbreath 2002). In many instances 
new organizational forms have seen the boundaries of the firm radically transformed, not 
only by increasing moves to outsourcing and other forms of relational contracting and 
networks, but because of the implications of the fluid nature of knowledge capital versus 
the relatively static nature of physical capital (Foss 2002, Galbreath 2002, Foss 2007). 
Galbreath (2002, 9) speaks of ‘extended enterprises’ and suggests that knowledge in the 
form of intangible ‘relationship assets’ may come to represent an organization’s most 
strategic asset, ushering in what he terms the relationship age. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Using the Hamel’s (1991) propositions as a theoretical underpinning (Yin 1994), a case 
study of a hybrid public-private strategic alliance was built. Thus the case study is both a 
process of enquiry and a product of that enquiry (Stake 2005). The individual case study 
is a specific, unique, bounded system which concentrates on experiential knowledge and 
pays close attention to the influence of its social, political and other contexts (Stake 
2005). This methodology is invaluable for reflecting on the complexity of organizations 
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because it allows us to explore the interplay of resources and competences within firms, 
and sheds light on the influence of corporate ideologies, beliefs, routines and how and 
when the firm sub-units are loosely- or tightly-coupled (Weick 1995). While the 
boundedness is a counterbalance to complexity on a large scale, the uniqueness is a 
challenge to generalisability (Stake 2005).  
 
The case provides the rich data (Siggelkow 2007, Weick 2007) required to understand the 
second order complexity of knowledge processes which are contextualised in social and 
cultural experiences (Tywoniak 2007a). Knowledge of second-order complexity is not 
validated through direct successful experience but rather through social processes of 
intersubjectivity (Passeron 1996). Thus the use of unstructured, qualitative interviews, 
which are seen to achieve Habermas’ (1984) ‘ideal speech situation’, is a sound 
methodological choice for eliciting data for case study development. This was 
supplemented with secondary data sources. For Habermas (1984) this social 
“communicative action” is an act of communicative rationality, where two subjects 
engage in an intersubjective relationship to achieve shared understanding. The choice of a 
single, rich case study gives us interesting insights into the experiences of those in an 
organization which has only recently started using strategic alliances as a means of 
achieving its objectives. While the methodological intention is to capture the richness of 
the single case study, Yin (1994) suggests that the description and analysis of a single 
case study has the ability to convey information about a more general phenomenon by 
calling attention to issues and by highlighting discrepancies between theory and practice. 
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CASE STUDY: MAIN ROADS WESTERN AUSTRALIA-PRIVATE SECTOR  
Established in 1926, Main Roads Western Australia (henceforth Main Roads) is Western 
Australia's statutory road authority. It is the longest serving public sector organization in 
the State and is responsible for highways and main roads with a replacement value of 
$21.4 billion (about 30 percent of the State’s total assets) (Main Roads Western Australia 
2006). The organization’s net assets are worth $22.5 billion and its responsibility extends 
to total asset management of the classified road network, project delivery associated with 
network expansion and maintenance and traffic and road user management (Main Roads 
Western Australia 2006). Operations cover 2.5 million square kilometres, with dramatic 
diversity of climate and road conditions, making Main Roads one of the largest 
geographically spread road agencies in the world. Western Australia has 174,008 
kilometres of roads, of which declared Highways and Main Roads comprise 17,706 
kilometres or about 10 percent. Main Roads also contributes funding to assist in the 
maintenance of 125,968 kilometres of local roads and 30,334 kilometres of roads through 
national parks and forests.  
 
Contracting guiding principles 
Three clear guiding principles govern its contracting decision making process. These 
specify that contracts should be commercially viable; they should transfer appropriate 
decision making and risk to industry; while Main Roads retains responsibility for 
standards and compliance audits (Main Roads Western Australia 2007). Cascading from 
these principles, projects are classified into three categories. Category 1 projects are 
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discrete major projects, with significant scope that cost more than $20 million. They are 
either delivered by Design and Construct contracts or Alliance contracts. Category 2 
projects generally cost between $1.5 million and $20 million and are competitively 
tendered either as Design and Construct contracts or as a mixture of separate design and 
separate construct. Category 3 projects are maintenance and rehabilitation projects, 
including capital works up to $1.5 million and are delivered through the Term Network 
Contracts and Term Asset Contracts.  
 
History of alliancing 
Up until 1980s Main Roads had total control over the design and construction of roads. 
Even thought as much as 60 percent of this work was handles by contractors, the 
organization continued to employed a huge internal day labour work force and employees 
felt that the organization had a very strong sense of control over its own destiny. In 1996, 
Main Roads began a metamorphosis from maker and maintainer of roads to owner and 
manager, which would have major significance for the organization (Edmonds 1997). 
Change was driven by the State Government economic rationalist reform agenda and lead 
to a rapid refocusing of Main Roads staff on outsourcing work to the private sector 
resulting in severe staff reductions (Edmonds 2007 in press).  
 
A 2001 report commissioned by the Minister into the effects on Main Roads of 
contracting out virtually all services, including design, found that the ‘full on’ contracting 
out approach had severely impacted Main Roads knowledge base (Edmonds 2007 in 
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press). The report recommended that within three years, Main Roads rebuild about 25 
percent of its in-house design capacity, so that it was not just an ‘informed buyer’, but a 
partner in the State road industry. 
 
Another critical step in becoming a partner in the road industry was the move towards 
relationship contracting and particularly alliancing. In December 2002 a new 
Commissioner took the helm at  Main Roads and he brought with him a wealth of 
contracting experience and knowledge from another government agency, including 
relationship contracting (Edmonds 2007 in press). The organization also placed 
relationships on the strategic agenda by making ‘building better relationships with key 
stakeholders by working together on aligning goals’ a focus of its strategic plan: 2003-
2007 (Main Roads Western Australia 2003b). Key benefits of this approach are 
minimising conflict inherent in adversarial style contracts, encouraging cooperation and 
reconnecting Main Roads staff directly with work to build capacity (Main Roads Western 
Australia 2003a, 2005, Edmonds 2007 in press). Those involve in alliances say that the 
biggest advantage is that they do away with the focus on dollar value, thus negating the 
conflict which is inherent in traditional contractual ‘relationships’. In alliances the focus 
is on problem-solving, innovation and flexibility. In November 2003, Main Roads 
entered into its first public-private alliance to build Stage 7 of the Roe Highway 
(Edmonds 2007 in press). This initial alliance contract was still fairly prescriptive, but 
was a significant step in an evolutionary process toward relinquishing control to an 
alliance entity. Four years later alliances operate as autonomous decision making bodies. 
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An explicit innovation, knowledge transfer and learning agenda 
Alliance contracts are awarded based on the integrity and reputation of the alliance 
partners rather than on the basis of cost, with the cost of the project not determined until 
after the contract had been signed and preliminary design work is completed 
(approximately six months into the contract). The key driver for Main Roads is to build 
the best possible roads for the community and so they seek alliance partners who can 
bring innovation to each project (Edmonds 2007 in press). While alliances with private 
consultants and contractors across a range of services are primarily risk/reward-sharing 
arrangements, they afford the opportunity for both public and private partners to engage 
in projects larger than any one entity would be able to undertake on their own. Thus 
alliances provide a capacity building potential for all individuals and organizations 
involved that is not inherent in conventional contracting arrangements. 
 
At the start of each project, an independent alliance facilitator works with the newly 
combined alliance management team to determine goals, including a commitment that 
everyone in the alliance will enhance their knowledge and skills. Part of this process 
involves establishing explicit non-cost key performance indicators, which are measured 
and rewarded by the client as part of the contract. These include training (including 
individual training plans), indigenous employment, occupational health and safety, 
stakeholder relationships and environmental issues. Thus there is a clearly articulated 
learning agenda. Project director and construction industry alliance member says: “The 
sharing of knowledge is a two way street and no one is bleeding off anyone else. While I 
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have enhanced my knowledge of design and geotechnical issues, I know that the Main 
Roads guys have a better understanding of contracting issues. Although there is a contract 
in place, things are very different from a conventional contracting situation in that we 
negotiate better outcomes and there is a different mindset.” 
 
Transparency 
Alliance partners agree that the biggest challenge in establishing an alliance partnership is 
bring people from different organizations together to think as one. The alliance facilitator 
facilitates much of the team development process and the establishment of common 
values. “Team development [of the management group] happened during the design 
phase and it is essential for future success. Because of the different cultures it has been a 
battle from day one to build a team and we have had to constantly work on our team 
culture and development. We have tried to get people out of their huddles and focused on 
creating a new team with a unique identity,” said a Main Roads alliance member. An 
industry partner comment reflects the assertion that complex cultural differences 
distinguish firms, including those in the same city (Badaracco 1991b): “No one way is 
right or wrong, but different organizations have a different culture, behaviours, work 
ethics and time management and we have had to work from identifying individual goals 
to formulating common goals.” 
 
Building on this platform, people feel that they operate in an environment where it is safe 
to speak openly. Thus, the alliance is simultaneously a common space, for alliance 
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members to share knowledge, learn and problem solve, and a “collaborative membrane” 
(Hamel 1991) between the alliance members and their parent organizations. The social 
context of a common space is integral to organizational learning which is essentially a 
social and cognitive process (Weick and Roberts 1993). This safe environment where 
experimentation is encouraged becomes the quintessential learning environment (Garvin 
1993), while the “collaborative membrane” fulfils the function of allowing learning to be 
effectively disseminated form one part of the organization to others within it (Starbuck 
1992). Main Roads staff seconded to alliances indicate that the interface with Main Roads 
is fluid, but never intrusive. However, from the Main Roads perspective the alliance 
interface is made complex by the multiple roles which Main Roads plays in the alliance, 
namely alliance partner, client (head office), stakeholder (regional office) and advisor 
(Technical Advisory Group). Tension arises because those who are integrally part of the 
process appreciate the flexible and innovative practices employed inside the alliance, 
while those on the outside may work to maintain the status quo and reinforce standards. 
These tensions may raise potential issues for receptivity and absorptive capacity within 
Main Roads, despite the multiple conduits for knowledge transfer and learning into the 
organization.  
 
Receptivity 
When alliance members return to the parent organization they take with them invaluable 
knowledge not only about the practice of constructing a particular road, but also about the 
collaborative, problem solving processes involved to achieve the outcome . The non-
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routinized actions and attempts to make sense of the unfamiliar inherent in problem 
solving are a critical source of radical learning (March, Sproull, and Tamuz 1991, 
Nonaka 1994, Miner and Mezias 1996, Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine 1999). Main Roads 
alliance members indicate that they closely document the contracting award process, all 
other processes and lessons learnt at each critical milestone. Specific interventions 
throughout the project are also documented and all this detail is fed back into Main 
Roads. The internal experience embellishes knowledge which flows back to the 
organization through other conduits like formal reporting, designs and the Technical 
Advisory Group.  
 
Main Roads people entering new alliances as team members have described the 
knowledge gleaned from the documented processes of previous alliance experiences as 
invaluable. Many Main Roads employees see the exchange of ideas, the flexibility to 
resolve differences of opinion and innovate in the open environment of the alliance as a 
very healthy way of building knowledge. This is particularly because effective feedback 
loops are being developed and this new knowledge challenges existing, traditional 
thinking within the parent organization. However, some employees are still skeptical 
about whether these feedback loops are effective fearing that much of the knowledge is 
still in people’s heads and not captured in systems. They suggest the need for 
conversations which capture not only the lessons learnt, but also the stories that go to 
make up experience. Certainly the lessons learnt from each alliance are supporting the 
development of future alliances. Skepticism at the efficacy of these measures must be 
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seen in the context of poor feedback loops in traditional project environments within the 
organization. This is characteristic of the construction industry as a whole, where few 
organizations have systems in place to acquire, capture or convert their lessons learned 
into knowledge to support future projects (Love, Irani, and Edwards 2003). Central to this 
issue is the challenge to project-to-project learning because of the unique and temporary 
nature of projects (Prencipe and Tell 2001). 
 
Employees involved with developing and implementing design standards see great 
benefits flowing back to their team. Involvement in large projects builds capacity because 
designers are involved in large complex projects, but they also benefit from the alliance 
office environment which breaks down silos between disciplines and allows for the close 
proximity of key players like the designer, constructor and the environmentalist. In this 
environment the constructor can work with the designer as the design unfolds. This 
scenario equates to Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) socialisation process or the 
explorer/L-shaped learning landscape proposed by Prencipe and Tell (2001) where 
learning is socially driven and the emphasis is on creating and sharing implicit and 
experience-based knowledge through joint participation in work activities (Prencipe et al. 
2005). Nonaka (1994) see this socialization process as vital to building trust between 
partners. Thus, this close, social multidisciplinary experience enhances the design 
capacity of the alliance member, but also equips them to review and update standards 
more effectively. Furthermore, those returning from alliances bring with them enhanced 
design software skills, which they are able to share with others in their team. However, 
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this process is often frustrated by the fact that within the organization, designers are using 
earlier versions of the design software and those returning from alliances often have the 
benefit of new knowledge and skills curtailed by this.   
 
Attitudes to allocating personnel to alliances  
Main Roads employees have a broad range of opinions about the effectiveness of 
alliancing and views differ depending on whether or not people have been involved in an 
alliance. One Main Roads alliance member admits that before going into an alliance he 
was skeptical when people spoke of the potential for knowledge transfer. “I didn’t think 
that the knowledge and skills transfer would work the way people told me it would, but I 
have learnt a huge amount about how contractors work and I have taught the contractors 
about how Main Roads works and there has been an enormous transfer of knowledge,” 
the respondent said. This attitude reflects some of the anxiety over asymmetric learning 
expressed by managers in Hamel’s (1991) study, as well as Weick’s (1979, 135) notion 
that ‘believing is seeing’, i.e. our mental models stand in the way of organizational 
learning.  
 
There is an element of frustration with alliances because they are so resource hungry and 
they take away some of the best people for extended periods of time. With limited 
resources this is potentially leading to a loss of opportunity in other areas. However, this 
is balanced against the fact that knowledge is flowing back into the organization. This 
reflects classic tensions between the rigidity and complexity of traditional organizational 
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structures and the flexibility of alliance project team highlighted by Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995). They ascertain that organizations need to develop new organizational structures 
in order to effectively and continuously create knowledge. The hypertext organization 
proposes interlacing flexible task forces (project layer) with hierarchical formal structures 
(business layer) to allow for knowledge to move dynamically between the two structural 
layers to create the organizations knowledge base (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). The 
organizational structure and culture needs to be oriented towards allowing the best people 
to move between these structures for the duration of projects, in the best interests of 
building the knowledge base. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Hamel (1991) presents a very context specific view of alliancing. In the case study, the 
creation of the hybrid public-private strategic alliance is driven firstly by the need for 
vertical integration rather than knowledge acquisition. Other factors driving the macro 
bargain are achieving the best outcome for the community and building construction 
industry capacity, including within government agencies, i.e. building social capital. 
Broadly speaking, social capital is the benefits that the stakeholders derive from their 
social relationships (Bourdieu 1986, Coleman 1988, 1990) and these can accrue to 
individuals, organizations and industries or communities (Walter, Lechner, and 
Kellermanns 2007).  
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In an environment where it is government policy to de-integrate, the competition for 
knowledge between alliance partners does not exist as Hamel describes it. Rather than an 
alliance between competitors we see an alliance between an elite public organization and 
several specialised private suppliers. Here the elite public organization equates to Quinn’s 
(1992) idea of the ‘central firm’ which collects together partners to contribute to the 
whole system and whose roles are clearly defined in a positive and creative way. Thus the 
context and intent of the partnership in this case is very different to that described by 
Hamel, where the alliance provide a pre-determined territory, i.e. getting the best road 
possible for the community and developing industry capacity in the state, as well as 
common space in which to collaborate to achieve this.  
 
The collaborative nature of this public-private alliance with its strong orientation towards 
team building, shared learning and relationships, as opposed to competing with partners 
for knowledge, results in the dual nature of the alliance as both a collaborative membrane 
and a common space. This intersubjective space is where the easy transfer of explicit 
knowledge occurs and as relationships develop the efficacy of the transfer of tacit 
knowledge increases. Here knowledge can be seen as neither the representation of reality 
nor the result of an application of ultimate rational criteria, but instead a competence to 
engage successfully in practice (Habermas 2003), which is at the heart of tacit knowledge 
or ‘know how’ (Ryle 1949, Polanyi 1966, Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). The 
intersubjective social context and the processes they embody represent knowledge of 
second-order complexity as explicit and tacit knowledge are combined to create common 
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knowledge which is able to pass from one community to another (Tywoniak 2007a). This 
intersubjective or common space can be compared with Nonaka’s concept of “ba” 
(Nonaka 1994, Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, Nonaka and Konno 1998, von Krogh, Ichijo, 
and Nonaka 2000, Nonaka, Toyama, and Konno 2001), which is a shared space for 
knowledge creation and transfer. This differs from the concept of “environment” in that it 
is both physical, virtual and mental and individuals operating in “ba” are indivisible from 
it (Cohen 1998, Nonaka and Konno 1998).  
 
From a western perspective, Nonaka’s “ba”, like his previous conceptualisation of 
“common cognitive ground” (Nonaka 1991), can be likened to Habermas’ (1984) 
intersubjective social context. In western organizational terms this could be seen as the 
enmeshing of the physical work environment and the organizational culture. In this 
context there is less emphasis on knowledge transactions and greater emphasis on 
personal connections and commitment to shared outcomes (Cohen 1998). Tacit to tacit 
knowledge is shared between individuals in processes characterised by “indwelling”, i.e. 
looking with others at what they do rather than looking at what others are doing (Polanyi 
1966, Cohen 1998, von Krogh, Ichijo, and Nonaka 2000). 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
These findings, especially that cooperation as competition does not hold for all alliances, 
have implications not only for management theory as outlined in the previous section, but 
for managers in organizations especially in the public sector.  The case study of Main 
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Roads illustrates how the organization has rebuilt some of its capabilities via a 
reconceptualization of the structure of the boundaries of their organization such that they 
are more permeable and focused specifically on both parties to any alliance benefiting 
from the learning that is possible. What is clearly evident from this case study is that 
organizational structure, especially the location of boundaries (i.e. what was undertaken 
by each partner) and the nature of the organizational boundary (which was designed to be 
as permeable as possible) fundamentally affected the learning and subsequent knowledge 
of Main Roads. Main Roads changed the boundaries of what they did such that their 
alliance partners worked with them on the preliminary stages (land resumption, heritage 
considerations etc.) and at the same time, employees were actively engaged in parts of 
both the design and the construct phases of the project.  Strict delineation of firm 
boundaries became far more difficult as both parties to the alliance were involved in 
many stages.  This in itself laid the foundations for knowledge transfer, but what also 
became central to the attempt by Main Roads to rebuild their capabilities was the design 
of organizational boundaries that were permeable and in fact the creation of systems to 
enhance the movement of knowledge between alliance partners. 
 
For government agencies involved in hybrid partnerships with private enterprises, this 
case demonstrates the need for senior management to consider where they position their 
operational boundaries (be they highly restricted through the use of outsourcing or far 
wider in scope) as these boundaries are critical determinants of a firm’s knowledge stocks 
both now and into the future. Restricting the operational boundaries does not necessarily 
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mean limiting a firm’s knowledge and its subsequent capabilities. The purposeful 
creation of permeable boundaries is likely to be even more important than where the firm 
boundaries were originally set. In fact, coupled with cooperative contracts such as those 
found in alliance contracts as opposed to taking a more adversarial tack with contractors 
could allow a firm to develop its knowledge (and capabilities) to be a systems integrator 
(as per Brusoni, Prencipe, and Pavitt 2001) as opposed to a contracts manager. Finally, at 
its most fundamental level, this case clearly demonstrates that knowledge management 
(and subsequent competitive advantage) cannot be disconnected from organisational 
structural issues as the two are inextricably linked. 
 
In respect of the limitation of this case study, we suggest a cautionary note, for while our 
methodology does not seek generalizability, nevertheless, our case study explores a very 
specific context. The fact that Main Roads was tasked with rebuilding its internal 
capabilities meant that the organization sought to develop structure and systems that 
would allow for this to occur rather than focus exclusively on efficiency principles. This 
approach led to a level of top management support for a cooperative attitude, which may 
not otherwise have been apparent. 
 
The different context and intent articulated in the case study require different processes 
and result in different outcomes than those which take place between competitors who 
collaborate (Hamel 1991). The intent of public-private alliance described is to leverage 
knowledge across organizational boundaries not to out-compete their alliance partner, but 
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to get more out of their own fixed resources, e.g. caps on employee numbers. 
Furthermore, given that these alliances allow for private sector partners to engage in 
larger projects, previously outside of their scope, both partners might be seeking 
efficiency gains, but not competitive advantage. Furthermore, it is likely that knowledge 
embedded in the powerful relationships fostered by these public-private alliances may 
come to represent the most strategic capital outcomes of the risk/reward-sharing 
arrangements (Galbreath 2002). 
 
While Hamel provides a good framework for understanding the determinants of 
knowledge transfer and learning, it is clear that the rise in public-private alliances with a 
social capacity agenda require a review of the theory on inter-partner knowledge transfer 
and learning.  
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